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Abstract Union dissolution is a constantly increasing phenomenon across
Europe—even in Italy where the prevalence of divorce has always been among the
lowest. This poses several questions on the potential consequences of such an event on
the families involved. Many studies show that women usually experience the worst
financial consequences, although there are few analyses on Italy, given the relatively
low levels of union instability. In this work we study the impact of separation on the
economic well-being of men and women using data from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP), analyzed using both objective and subjective measures. By
means of a matching method, we also estimate the effect of union dissolution, taking
account of possible variations according to the different living arrangements adopted
by ex-partners after separation. Results confirm that women experience worse
economic distress than men. However, there is also a significant drop in economic
well-being among non-custodial fathers who live alone after separation. In addition,
it is found that income-based measures do not encapsulate all the dimensions of
well-being, and therefore need to be complemented with other measures.
Keywords Union dissolution  Italy  Economic well-being  ECHP
Re´sume´ Les ruptures d’union sont en hausse constante en Europe-meˆme en Italie
ou` la fre´quence des divorces est parmi les plus basses. Cette tendance soule`ve
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diffe´rentes questions sur les conse´quences des ruptures sur les familles concerne´es.
De nombreuses e´tudes ont montre´ que c’e´taient les femmes qui subissaient les
conse´quences financie`res les plus de´favorables, mais la situation est mal connue en
Italie, du fait de la rarete´ relative du phe´nome`ne. Nous analysons l’impact de la
se´paration sur le bien-eˆtre e´conomique des hommes et des femmes a` partir des
donne´es du Panel Europe´en des Me´nages (ECHP), en nous appuyant a` la fois sur des
mesures objectives et subjectives. A l’aide d’appariements, les effets des ruptures
d’unions sont estime´s, en conside´rant une variation possible suivant le type de
me´nage dans lequel les anciens conjoints s’installent apre`s la se´paration. Les
re´sultats confirment l’existence de plus grandes difficulte´s e´conomiques chez les
femmes. Toutefois, il y a e´galement une chute significative de bien-eˆtre e´conomique
parmi les pe`res qui n’ont pas la garde des enfants et vivent seuls apre`s la se´paration.
En outre, il apparaıˆt que les mesures base´es sur le revenu ne refle`tent pas toutes les
dimensions du bien-eˆtre, et doivent par conse´quent eˆtre comple´te´es par d’autres
mesures.
Mots-cle´s Ruptures d’union  Italie  Bien-eˆtre e´conomique  ECHP
1 Introduction and Research Questions
In recent years, a growing body of literature has emerged on the economic
consequences of marital disruption. Some recent studies have explored this topic
with a comparative approach (Dewilde 2003; Uunk 2004; Andreß et al. 2006;
Aassve et al. 2007). Most of them use welfare regime theory (Esping-Andersen
1990) as a theoretical framework to explain differences across European countries:
the weaker the support given by the state, the stronger the impact on couples of
marital dissolution.
However, this equation is questionable, and country differences in the economic
impacts of marriage dissolution may be explained in several ways: different
characteristics of separating couples (for instance, in terms of educational level, see
Harkonen and Dronkers 2006), different age profile and biographies before
separation (the presence of children is an important variable, see Aassve et al. 2007)
and different living arrangements after separation.
As a confirmation of this, other comparative analyses show that the Italian
poverty rate among children living with only one parent (in most cases, the mother)
is lower than in Germany or France, and similar to that of children living in intact
families (Del Boca 2003). A convincing explanation attributes this result to country
differences in the characteristics of divorced women. In this sense, single Italian
mothers are more protected from poverty because of their higher human capital
investment (education and work) and lower number of children (see again Del Boca
2003).
Another interesting point in such literature is the gender difference: empirical
analysis has shown that women are in the weaker position, especially if they have
children to look after (Douglas and Murch 2000; Jarvis and Jenkins 1999;
McLanahan et al. 1995; Smock et al. 1999).
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Other analyses using individual data show that men do not suffer economically
after separation; on the contrary, their household income even increases slightly
(Andreß et al. 2006). However, the picture changes greatly when we consider the
subgroup of parents. According to the estimates of Bradshaw and Mayhew (2002),
in the case of non-custodial fathers at least, there is loss of income compared with
their economic situation before separation, and in some cases the loss may even
reach 50%.
McManus and Di Prete (2001) and Aassve et al. (2007) show that men also
lose economic status after their union dissolution. In particular, Aassve et al.
(2007) find that although men are unaffected by union dissolution in monetary
terms, when well-being is measured by non-monetary deprivation, the effect of
separation becomes significant and in some cases even larger than that of women.
However, this does not apply to Mediterranean countries, where the estimated
impact of separation on non-monetary indices is not significantly different from
zero.
This study focuses on a single country, namely Italy, rather than making further
comparisons, in order to explore in more depth some of the mechanisms that welfare
regime theory is not able to explain. In particular, we want to explore an important
point: the economic consequences of separation are likely to vary across the
different living conditions after union dissolution. Considering that in Italy
maintaining a separate dwelling may be extremely expensive, we presume that
those who, after separation, share their home with other adults (parents, new
partners, friends) have a greater opportunity to make substantial savings in housing
and housework costs with respect to those who choose (or are obliged) to live alone
or with their children only. In this case, the family of origin, and especially parents,
can provide substantial support to separated men and women, thus alleviating some
of the negative effects of union dissolution.
If our hypothesis is confirmed, this provides an explanation for what Aassve et al.
(2007) found (i.e. a negative effect for men when well-being is measured with non-
monetary indices, but not for men from Mediterranean countries): men in Southern
Europe are more likely to return to the parental home, and parental support offsets
the increased expenses due to separation, whereas men from Central and Northern
Europe cannot count on this resource, and this is why they experience a worse
economic situation after separation.
Moreover, two other technical issues are considered. The first one is the potential
problem of selection bias. Some of the previously cited results were obtained with
descriptive analyses, which compare circumstances before and after separation.
Interpretation must be cautious in these cases. The trend observed in the changes
of household income before and after separation may be the same as that of
non-separating couples. Moreover, self-selection may severely bias the true causal
relationship between union dissolution and economic consequences. Couples
undergoing a marital split may be qualitatively different from those not doing so
in terms of other background characteristics such as age, educational level,
employment, income, living arrangements and social network prior to the event.
These differences may affect both the risk of union dissolution and the economic
well-being of partners, so that the real impact of the event may be biased. In order to
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tackle all these issues and to isolate the ‘‘pure’’ effect of the separation event, we use
a Difference-in-Differences estimator combined with Propensity Score Matching
techniques (see Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman et al. 1997).
Second, we wished to apply several well-being measures. The economic
consequences of a partnership dissolution are usually analyzed by examining
changes in household income. However, even when net of taxes and adjusted for
household composition, household income may give a distorted picture of the
changes in individuals’ economic well-being after separation. Marital dissolution
implies important changes in daily expenditure and these changes differ greatly by
gender. This feature is only partially taken into account by the household income
measure. For example, in the case of dependent children, adjusted household
income takes into account in some crude way the costs of children for the resident
parent (usually the mother), but does not consider at all those of the non-resident
parent (usually the father), such as increased expenses for alimony, travel to visit the
children, or renting new accommodation. Using only household income to measure
the economic consequences of union dissolution may therefore overestimate the
economic well-being of the non-resident father after separation and, consequently,
overestimate—at least for those with children—gender differences in the economic
effect of separation.
Therefore, we did not use only the traditional monetary measure (equalized
household income) in our analyses, but also other subjective indicators measuring
the living standards and ability of households to afford a certain set of expenses. Our
hypothesis is that subjective indicators may reveal negative consequences even
though monetary ones do not.
The study is carried out using data from the eight waves of the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) carried out in 1994–2001. This source allows
longitudinal analysis, so that we can observe short-term changes. In particular, we
aim at analyzing changes in economic status from the year before the break-up to
the year after it.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of the social
and institutional Italian background. Section 3 describes the data and variables used.
Sections 4 and 5 present the results: the former gives some descriptive results, and
the latter illustrates the model (5.1) and the effects of union dissolution after
controlling for selection bias (5.2) and the living arrangements after separation
(5.3). Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
2 The Socio-institutional Background
In Italy, the phenomenon of the civil dissolution of marriages has a short history.
Until little more than 30 years ago, only legal separation was possible, with little
impact on most of the civil effects of marriage. Divorce was introduced by law in
1970. A request for divorce could be made after 5 years of legal separation, and in
1987, a new law reduced this period from 5 to 3 years. According to Italian
legislation therefore—with a few exceptions—legal separation is the necessary
precondition for divorce. However, not all legal separations are converted into a
48 F. Ongaro et al.
123
divorce: only half (51%) of the total number of separations granted in 1995 were
translated later into divorce up to the year 2002 (ISTAT 2004).
It is not surprising, therefore, that dissolution of marital unions in Italy is much
less frequent than in other European countries. The legislation has imposed (and still
imposes) several constraints on divorce, and this indicates that its social acceptance
is still relatively low.
However, in the last few years legal separations and divorces have increased
sharply (Fig. 1). The total separation rate (91,000), which was 129 in 1990, 158 in
1995, 228 in 2000, reached 257 in 2002. A similar trend was observed for the total
divorce rate: in the same years, its values (91,000) were, respectively, 78, 80, 115
and 131.
Legal separation and especially divorce are not generally events undergone by
young people. The people who separated in 2002 were on average 40 years old
(women 39, men 42) and their marriages had lasted on average 13 years. Most of
these couples (69%) had children and half (52%) had at least one child under the age
of 18, custody of whom after separation was usually granted to the mothers.1 In
addition, those who separated had higher human capital than intact couples: in 2002,
half (49% men, 53% women) had medium-high education and 70% of the women
were employed (ISTAT 2004).
It is clear that this population of separated individuals is a selected population.
The selection is connected to the fact that divorce is more common in some social
groups (besides in some countries). We do not focus here on the literature on the
causes of divorce, but we will nonetheless consider some remarks.
The economic tradition attributes the rise in divorce rates to changes in female
socio-economic status due to their entry into the labour market. For Italy, this is
Fig. 1 Number of separations and divorces in Italy, 1984–2002. Source: National Statistical Institute
(ISTAT)
1 In 2002, after separation, in 85% of cases the custody of children under 18 was granted to mothers, in
4% to fathers and 11% to both parents.
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proved in the study by De Rose (1992). In fact, a particular trend, (considering
female education and the risk of divorce) predicted by Goode (1962, 1993) and
empirically tested by Harkonen and Dronkers (2006), is observed. They demon-
strated an inverse relationship between the social composition of divorce and the
level of modernization. In particular, this study found that in Italy, as well as in
other countries where the dissolution rate is still low (France, Greece, Poland and
Spain), higher educated couples divorce more often than lower educated couples.
Conversely, when the dissolution level is high (Austria, Lithuania and the United
States), lower educated couples divorce more often than higher educated ones.
These considerations indicate that caution is needed in interpreting analysis
results and inter-country comparisons.
What kind of economic problems may these couples experience in the first years
after separation, and what kind of support does Italian society offer them?
It is well-known that the Italian welfare system offers little support to individuals
undergoing economic hardship, and family policies are also rather weak. At national
level, most resources are channelled into social security, education and health. Both
the education and public health systems offer public services (often of good quality)
at relatively low cost; and for low-income families, costs may be further reduced or
even cancelled. On the other hand, there are few specific services for working
mothers (EUROSTAT 2007). Women can rely on a highly protective regulation of
maternity leave, but beyond that, childcare services are deficient. Considering also
the strict regulation of the labour market, and the rigid organization of everyday life,
Italian women have serious difficulties in reconciling work and parenthood. Support
from families (especially parents) often compensates for these deficiencies in the
welfare system (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2003). Cash support
(to individuals and families) is also quite limited, and the few monetary allowances
are mainly focused on reducing poverty (OECD 2004). Benefits for families with
children are few and limited to low-income and large households. Moreover, the
introduction of a minimum income is still at an experimental stage, with many
variants, depending on the initiative of local administrations.
Therefore, in Italian society, separated men and women in economic difficulties
can count on a system of public services and access to economic benefits which are
means-tested. Access to these services (e.g. cre`ches, nursery schools) and benefits is
further facilitated for single parent families.
However, for a separated woman, the main factor of economic security is
participation on the labour market, considering that, generally, those who have jobs,
have full-time permanent contracts. On the other hand, those without a personal
income from work risk severe economic difficulties. With legal separation,
solidarity ties do not disappear between the partners: the law obliges the
economically stronger partner to pay maintenance to the weaker one. In practice,
housewives cannot count too much on this tool, not only because her husband may
not be able, or willing to pay the sums fixed by the judge2, but also because the
courts have the tendency to assign only subsistence aims to this instrument. The
2 In addition, Italian regulations do not provide fast inexpensive means of constraining reluctant partners
to pay alimony (e. g. there are not forms of direct monetary transfer at source).
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statement according to which alimony is granted to a partner in case she/he has no
‘‘suitable personal income or cannot obtain it because of problems of age, health, or
young children needing care’’ is interpreted in a very restrictive way and, in general,
it is sufficient for a woman to have a job or to be in a position of getting one, for her
not to receive alimony (Barbagli and Saraceno 1998). Judges’ sentences do not
consider that, in a still relatively rigid and employee-protective labour market like
the Italian one, women who have invested in a family—particularly if they are
relatively old and/or have very young children—not only have difficulty in finding
adequately paid jobs, but even in finding any work at all. In short, considering the
characteristics of both the labour market and welfare, we must conclude that Italian
women who separate from their partners/husbands without being economically
independent risk finding themselves in serious economic difficulties, and this may
perhaps explain the relatively high rate of labour force participation among those
who undergo a separation.
We should also consider housing market rigidities as an important factor. Finding
somewhere to live after the break-up is a particularly hard problem for both ex-
partners. In a country where house rents on the private market are extremely high,
public residential building projects are relatively few, and the share of home owners
is about 70% (ISTAT 2007), renting or purchasing a new home is very expensive. In
this case, men with young children are the most disadvantaged. If there are
dependent children, judges tend to assign the house in which the couple lived before
separation to the custodial parent, independently of who the owner or tenant is. In
2002, 58% of separation decisions assigned the house where the family lived before
legal separation to the wife, and only in 23% of cases to the husband (the remaining
cases are of couples who decided to leave their house to live in new, independent
and different dwellings) (ISTAT 2004). This is consistent with the fact that women
are the custodial parents3 much more frequently than men.
Substantial help is given to separated people by the family of origin. Although
separation is still frowned upon in several sectors of society, siblings and especially
parents are supportive to separated family members: they support them psycholog-
ically and help them face daily problems, offering goods, services, money and
hospitality. The help offered by the family of origin is gender-differentiated because
men and women have different needs: women mainly receive money, necessary
goods, help in looking after children (allowing the mothers to work and maintain
their economic independence); men mainly receive hospitality and help with their
children (Barbagli and Saraceno 1998). As in other circumstances, the strong bonds
of the Italian family make up for deficiencies in welfare, thus attenuating the
negative economic consequences of union dissolution.
3 Women do not always maintain their advantage. With divorce, things change, since 48% of couples
leave their family house for separate, independent dwellings (ISTAT 2004). According to a 1990 survey
(moreover, not representative of Italian reality) 2 years after separation, a woman with the custody of
children maintains the use of a house only if it is the property of the woman herself, or of both partners; if
the owner is the man or the man’s parents, the use of the house generally returns to him (Barbagli and
Saraceno 1998).
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3 Data and Variables
We use data from the ECHP to examine the relationship between union disruption
and the subsequent economic situation. The ECHP is a longitudinal survey on
private households, conducted annually between 1994 and 2001, in 15 EU countries
(including Italy).
The survey collected detailed information on the economic and socio-
demographic characteristics of households and of their members aged over 16. Its
longitudinal design made it possible to follow up and interview the same set of
people for several consecutive years.
For detailed analysis of the economic consequences of partnership dissolution, all
eight waves of the panel (1994–2001) were examined. It was essential to use
longitudinal data, as we aimed to compare the situation before and after separation.
Thus for the population of interest, we considered information for years t (before
dissolution) and t + 1 (after dissolution). We should bear in mind that with this
small window of observation we measure only the short-term impact of separation.
The limited time span of ECHP does not allow to identify medium- or long-term
impact as longer time intervals would reduce the number of cases too sharply.
Aassve et al. (2007) use the same window of observation. Uunk (2004) uses a larger
window (2 years), but as a consequence the number of cases in Italy is only 69.
One technical issue was the definition of the event of interest. Accurate data
exploration revealed that respondents have the tendency to confound actual and legal
marital status.4 This, in practice, means that many ‘‘de facto’’ separated people do not
report themselves as separated until their separation has been legally acknowledged.
For example, we observe many individuals who stopped living with their partners
without reporting being separated (about 26% of married men who reported being
separated at time t + 1 do not live in a couple at time t; the percentage is about 28%
for women). So considering only marital status transitions created several
inconsistencies with the living arrangements of separated individuals.
The alternative approach we take combines information on marital status and on
partners’ residence: if two partners stopped living in the same house (not because of
the death of a partner—we excluded transitions to widowhood), they were deemed
to be separated. Thus, a separation is defined as the end of cohabitation of partners,
either in consensual union or in marriage.5
This choice clearly has some drawbacks: individuals who do not live together,
not because of separation but for other causes, are considered to be separated (so
that living apart together and commuting marriages may incorrectly be regarded as
separations). However, we expect that such cases are rare.6 More important, in this
4 The categories available for marital status were: married, separated, divorced, widowed, never married.
5 For married couples this mainly corresponds to separation: we focus on separation and not divorce,
because separation is connected to greater economic changes than legal divorce, which follows
separation—sometimes several years later, when the economic situation may already have stabilized (see
Andreß and Gullner 2001, quoted by Andreß et al. 2006).
6 From another survey (Family and Social Subjects 2003) conducted by ISTAT, we find that the
percentage of married individuals living outside the conjugal home is 2.7%. Given the rarity of the
phenomenon, the number of studies on this topic is negligible in Italy.
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way we defined the event of interest clearly and also identified the moment
characterized by the greatest economic changes.
Analysis is restricted to the population less than 60 years old, to avoid confusing
income changes due to separation and those due to retirement.
In this way, we identify 314 cases of partnership break-up, most of which (85%)
are marital dissolutions (Table 1). In particular, the sample of separated persons is
made up of 142 men and 172 women: they come from 206 couples but only for 108
of them do we have information on both partners. There are some cases (64 for men
and 34 for women), indeed, in which one of the two partners is not available after
separation. Men are more likely to drop out after separation than women. This is
reasonable given that men are also more likely to leave the conjugal home. Table 1
also shows some features of individuals undergoing a separation in the year (t)
before the event. They are individuals in their forties on average, with relatively
long union durations (the mean duration of the marriage was about 13 years for men
and 15 for women) and most of them have children (67% of men and 75% of
women). The deviation in duration of marriage and cohabitation for men and
women is related to the attrition of separated individuals which is gender-specific.
Separated women who drop out are younger on average (about 34 years old) than
those who do not drop out (about 38 years old). Conversely, separated men who
drop out are the same age on average as those who do not. This is probably an
indirect effect of the way the conjugal home is assigned: women without children—
and therefore younger—are more likely to leave the home then mothers. This form
of selection has to be borne in mind. As expected, female labour market
participation is quite high (about 60%), compared to national levels. Moreover, they
are more represented in the North of Italy. Confirming the literature of Sect. 2, they
have a quite high educational level.
The central focus of our analysis was the economic situation of individuals
before and after separation.
ECHP provides rich information on individual (yearly) and household (monthly)
incomes, together with data on many subjective aspects of the economic situation
(such as housing quality, possession of durables, arrears and lifestyle quality).
Unfortunately, no other information related, for example, to home ownership and
personal expenditure, is available.
ECHP provides two measures of total household income. The first one is the sum
of household members’ individual (yearly) net incomes and it is constructed from
detailed questions on income from several sources, and reported retrospectively for
the previous calendar year. The second measure is the household (monthly) net
income and it refers to the current year; it is reported by the respondent to the
household interview7 and not constructed from detailed information from different
sources.
7 In the household interview, respondents are asked to recall all the sources of income (wages and
salaries, income from self-employment or farming, pensions, unemployment/redundancy benefits, any
other social benefits or grants and private income such as housing allowances) without specifying the
amount of income from each source. Then the amount of household income is asked: ‘‘What is your
household’s total net income per month?’’.
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In theory, the first measure is more reliable than the second one, but in fact, there
are some issues that make detailed yearly household income measure less attractive.
First, it refers to year t - 1: this forces researchers to use its lagged value, thus
reducing the sample size—and this is a particularly critical issue in our case given
the already small number of cases we have. Second, being the summary of
information collected from several questions, the detailed income measure is much
more plagued by item non-response, whose prevalence is around 22%, and unit
non-response (around 3–4%), and the imputation procedure implemented by
Eurostat does not seem to fully overcome this problem (Nicoletti and Peracchi
2006).
Given these problems, we used the second measure of income for our analysis; in
particular, we refer to the equivalized (according to the modified OECD scale) total
monthly net household income 1 year before and one after separation, measured in
euros, i.e. the sum of incomes from labour, assets, and private and public transfers,
net of taxes, for all household members.
We also complement the income measure with several subjective items. Income
is only a monetary measure of economic well-being, and considering the effect of
separation on this aspect alone may be a limited approach, as other aspects of
economic well-being (e. g. life-style and housing quality) are disregarded. On the
one hand, the income measure is more reliable as it is more objective, and its change
after separation is not affected by emotional distress, which could be the case when
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the sub-sample of separated individuals at the year t (before separation)
Men Women
Number of union dissolutions (marital and non-marital) 142 172
Number of marital dissolutions 120 147
Average marriage duration 12.9 14.6
Average cohabitation duration 4.5 5.5
% Couples with children 66.9 75.0
% Living with parents 8.5 4.7
Mean age 41.0 38.7
Mean age of youngest child 10.5 11.5
% Working 88.7 59.3
% Working in self employment 38.9 18.6
% With high educational level 18.3 8.1
% With medium educational level 34.5 45.3
% Living in the North 38.7 40.7
% Living in the centre 30.9 29.6
% Living in the South 30.3 29.6
% Without individual income 7.7 30.2
Mean personal yearly income (in Euro) 12,955 9,787
% Without ‘‘rest of household’’ income 23.2 6.9
Mean ‘‘rest of household’’ yearly equivalized income (in Euro) 9,816 10,517
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using subjective indicators. On the other hand, it is recognized that well-being has
many more dimensions, often non monetary in nature (see, for instance, Atkinson
2003).
We, therefore, also considered some indicators measuring: perception of income
variations compared to the previous year (on a five-point scale ranging from
1 = clearly improved, to 5 = clearly deteriorated), the ability to make ends meet
(on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = with great difficulty, to 5 = very easily),
the ability of the household to face a set of costs, related to home maintenance and
to some payments. These items are reported as dichotomous variables with value of
1 if the household can afford a particular cost and 0 otherwise. Savings are also
considered with a dummy variable, equal to 1 if there is normally some money left
to save and 0 otherwise. Moreover a living standard index is obtained using some
items related to life-style: they include the ability to pay for a week’s annual holiday
away from home, to buy new, rather than second-hand, clothes, to eat meat, chicken
or fish, if desired, every second day and to have friends or family for drinks or meals
at least once a month. Each item is described through a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the household can afford that cost and 0 otherwise; the living standard index is
obtained as the arithmetic mean of these items. A measure of its psychometric
quality is provided by Cronbach’s Alpha which, with a value of 0.8, assures the
consistency of this index (Nunally 1978).
In addition, labour market transitions are analyzed, expecting that individuals,
usually women without jobs, are looking for a source of personal income after
separation. From Table 1 we note that the percentage of working women is about
60% (about 90% for men), and women’s income is lower on average than men’s and
18% do not have any income at all. These descriptive figures suggest that
prevalence of the male-breadwinner model among Italian families is still high. As a
consequence, some women probably need a new source of income after separation,
so they may look for a job.
Finally, we considered transitions in living arrangements of men and women who
underwent a separation (Table 2).
The definition of living arrangements used here distinguishes couples with other
adults (parents or siblings, excluding adult children) from couples without other
adults. Most separated individuals (83% of men, 85% of women) had lived with
their families without other adults before separation. The majority of them had
children. After separation there is a dramatic change in the ex-partners’ living
arrangements, and the change depends strongly on the presence of children. When
there are no children, the routes taken by men and women after separation are quite
similar: most of them live alone whereas about 17% return to the parental home.
There is a greater gender difference among couples with children: 23% of separated
men move to a single-parent family after separation, but the figure for women
reaches 85%. As a consequence, after separation, on the whole, only 15% of men
live as single-parents, 26% return to the parental home, and the majority live alone.
60% of women live with their children (as single parents), 25% live alone and fewer
than 10% return to their parents. In both cases (especially for men), fewer than 5%
form new couples.
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4 Descriptive Results
A preliminary descriptive analysis, based on the eight waves of the ECHP, suggests
that the economic consequences of separation are gender-specific, as also found in
the literature. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the well-being indicators we
considered for separated individuals before and after the event.
Starting from the objective measure of well-being, we see an income drop after
separation for women, whereas men’s average income increases by more than 25%.
However, this is not entirely consistent with the subjective perception of income
situation compared to the previous year: for women the percentage of those
reporting a deteriorated income situation grows from 31 to 55%, but this happens
also for men, although to a lesser extent (from 36 to 46%). The percentages of those
reporting difficulties in making ends meet increase for women after separation and
slightly decrease for men. In addition, women have more difficulties after separation
in affording several home-related costs (e.g. heating and furniture) and some
payments (scheduled rent), whereas the figures for men do not vary significantly
after separation. The ability to afford certain basic expenses also decreases for
women. For instance, before separation 43% reported being able to replace worn-
out furniture, and this fraction drops to 34% after separation. These figures remain
practically unaltered for men. The percentage of those who are left with some
money for savings also decreases, and again the drop is much larger for women.
Table 2 Living arrangement transitions of individuals who underwent a separation
After separation
(time t + 1)
Without others With others (with or without children) Number of
cases (=100)
Before separation
(time t)
Alone With children With a new partner With parents
Men
Without others
Couple 81.08 2.70 0.00 16.22 37
Couple with children 51.85 23.46 1.23 23.46 81
With others
Couple 40.00 10.00 0.00 50.00 10
Couple with children 21.43 7.14 21.43 50.00 14
Total 55.63 15.49 2.82 26.06 142
Women
Without others
Couple 71.43 5.71 5.71 17.14 35
Couple with children 12.61 85.59 0.90 0.90 111
With others
Couple 37.50 0.00 37.50 25.00 8
Couple with children 5.56 38.89 22.22 33.33 18
Total 25.00 60.47 5.81 8.72 172
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Finally, we note that women’s labour market participation rate increases after
separation.
5 Modelling the Economic Consequences of Union Dissolution
5.1 Causal Analysis
Although the above descriptive analysis offers many indications on the association
between separation and the subsequent changes in life-style, it does not suffice to
identify the causal relation between the two processes. Differences between those
who undergo separation and those who do not may be influenced by the different
background characteristics of the two groups. For instance, we may expect that
couples undergoing separation have a different level of well-being prior to
separation with respect to that of other couples. Generally speaking, the two groups
may be qualitatively different in terms of many background variables, and we need
to control for these variables if we aim to tease out the causal effect of separation
from the spurious dependence brought about by these variables.
More than one solution is possible for this identification of causal effect. One is to
use an instrumental variable (Angrist 1998), which allows us to simulate a random
assignment of treatment (in our case, the treatment is the point of separation). In
observational studies, treatment is not randomly assigned, but there may be an
exogenous variable correlated with treatment. For example, Angrist and Evans
Table 3 Household economic conditions of individuals who underwent a separation, 1 year before and
1 year after the event
Male Female
Before After Before After
Total monthly net household income (equivalized, in Euro) 924 1,175 839 719
Household reporting a deteriorated income situation compared
with previous year (%)
36.3 45.8 30.8 54.6
Household reporting difficulties making ends meet (%) 55.6 52.1 61.1 71.5
Household can afford to keep its home adequately warm (%) 83.1 82.4 82.5 78.4
Household can afford to replace any worn-out furniture (%) 45.8 42.3 42.7 33.9
Household has been unable to afford payments related to life-stylea 0.69 0.75 0.78 0.89
Household has been unable to pay scheduled rent for
accommodation (%)
2.8 3.5 2.3 3.5
Household has been unable to pay scheduled mortgage payments (%) 1.4 0.0 1.7 0.0
Household has been unable to pay scheduled utility bills (electricity,
water, gas) (%)
7.7 5.6 8.2 8.1
Household has been unable to pay hire-purchase instalments or other
loan repayments (%)
4.9 1.4 4.7 2.9
Household has some money left for savings (%) 31.7 28.6 32.6 19.8
Working (%) 88.7 86.6 59.3 62.9
a Arithmetic mean values of several life-style related items
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(1998) used same-sex children as an instrument to estimate the effect of fertility on
parents’ labour supply. However, finding such a variable is extremely difficult, as
highlighted by Heckman et al. (1999).
A different route was proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) by assuming
that we record all variables X that confound the effect of treatment on outcome. This
may be identified by making the estimate conditional on X. A dimensionality
problem arises when the number of possible confounder variables is higher than 5,
but the above authors showed that it is possible to condition on the propensity score,
instead of X, i.e. the probability of undergoing the event conditional on the value of
X, easily estimated by means of a probit or logit regression model.
Given the relative richness of information of the ECHP data and the problems of
finding a proper instrumental variable, we use propensity score matching to isolate
the causal effect of separation. Therefore, we assume that we observe all the
confounding variables in our dataset—an assumption commonly referred to as the
conditional independence assumption (CIA), ruling out the effect of unobserved
heterogeneity. However, CIA is quite unlikely to hold, as there may be some
confounding variables that are not in the set of observed covariates. These variables
induce a hidden bias in the propensity score matching estimates. Heckman et al.
(1997) suggest relaxing CIA, combining a Difference-in-Differences estimator with
the matching procedure. Basically, we estimate the effect of treatment on the prime
difference of outcome in two subsequent years. Thus, for treated individuals we
have the difference between outcome 1 year after treatment and 1 year before,
whereas for controls (i.e., non-treated individuals), we only have just the difference
between two consecutive years. In practice, this is a fixed-effect estimator, and if
unobserved heterogeneity is time-invariant, its effect is netted out by the Difference-
in-Differences estimator. This means that a milder assumption than CIA is imposed
on our inference framework.
As explained in Sect. 3, most of the men and women in our sample are members
of the same married couple, hence they have the same value of household income.
This means that the well-being measures at t are equal between members of the
same couple. The results may be affected by this sort of dependency, but as we use
separate models for men and women, comparisons can be made.
There are many matching methods (see Becker and Ichino 2002; Smith and Todd
2005, for a list). In this article, we use a nearest-neighbour method in which every
treated individual is matched to the closest control, closeness being determined by
the distance of the propensity scores.
Table 4 shows the results of the logit model used to estimate the propensity scores.
We included here wave, age, gender, regional location, education, employment
status, type of union, number of children, whether the individual was living with
parent or not before separation and yearly personal and household income, the latter
being constructed by subtracting the yearly personal income of the individual from
the total yearly household income, and then equivalized. We also included the value
of outcome before treatment: as we estimate the impact of separation on several
outcomes, specification of the logit model changes accordingly.
The results of our logit model are in line with the literature referring to Italy and
some other countries (Harkonen and Dronkers 2006). The propensity to separate
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decreases with age, but its effect is significant only for men. Cohabiting unions are
more prone to dissolution, and a high educational level is also positively associated
with this risk. Again, this effect is significant only for men. Interestingly, personal
income has a different impact according to gender: for men the higher the income,
the lower the propensity to separate, while for women the opposite is true. Having
children has a protective function against separation although this is only evident for
men. People living in the south of Italy are less likely to separate. Lastly, if men live
with their parents, the probability of union dissolution increases.
Therefore, the following estimates were computed net of these variables. Note
that, in this framework, the correct specification of the logit model is not a problem:
this method is basically a non-parametric one, so we do not need to specify the
correct functional form of the relation between treatment and covariates (see
Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005).
5.2 Results
The results of the matching method outlined above are reported in Table 5. The
quality of matching has been assessed using a t-test for the equality of means of
the treated and control groups for each covariate. The test shows that after matching,
Table 4 Logit model on probability of undergoing separation (estimates for propensity score)
Men Women
Estimate SE Estimate SE
Intercept -6.671 1.384*** -4.620 1.329***
Year 1995 (Ref. 1994) 0.459 0.350 0.233 0.309
Year 1996 (Ref. 1994) 0.698 0.338** 0.401 0.303
Year 1997 (Ref. 1994) 0.741 0.339** 0.692 0.292**
Year 1998 (Ref. 1994) 0.263 0.371 0.343 0.312
Year 1999 (Ref. 1994) 0.115 0.386 0.113 0.331
Year 2000 (Ref. 1994) 0.245 0.387 -0.002 0.350
Cohabiting union (Ref. Marriage) 1.964 0.253*** 1.966 0.235***
Age -0.015 0.010 -0.020 0.009**
Education: medium (Ref. low) 0.146 0.198 0.289 0.177
Education: high (Ref. low) 0.948 0.255*** 0.091 0.309
In paid employment (Ref. not
working)
-0.031 0.308 0.192 0.246
Self employed (Ref. not working) 0.316 0.304 0.196 0.287
Personal income (log) -0.094 0.034*** 0.044 0.026*
‘‘Rest of household’’ income (log) 0.310 0.189 -0.080 0.183
North (Ref. South) 0.125 0.225 0.209 0.206
Centre (Ref. South) 0.413 0.226* 0.388 0.209*
Number of children -0.278 0.099*** -0.033 0.085
Parents living with household 0.428 0.194** 0.400 0.252
Significance levels: ***, 0.01; **, 0.05; *, 0.1
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the two groups are balanced, i.e. they do not show any significant difference in
terms of observed covariates.
Two aspects of the results of Table 5 must be borne in mind: first, we
transformed some well-being indicators in order to harmonize them: for each item a
negative sign means a well-being reduction and a positive sign a well-being
increase. This does not apply to labour force outcomes, whose values in Table 5
reflect the effect on labour force exit rate, labour force entry rate and number of
hours worked, respectively. Second, the results of Table 5 must be interpreted
bearing in mind the Difference-in-Differences estimator. This means that the table
shows the difference between the average changes in the outcome of treated groups
and in the outcome of control groups. For example, the estimate -190 for women’s
total monthly household income means that the difference between income before
and after separation is lower by 190 euro on an average than the average income
change of controls. Bearing this in mind, the results basically confirm the findings of
descriptive analysis: the income situation of women is highly likely to worsen after
separation, more so than that of men. The latter may even be better off after
separation, as their equivalent monthly household income is significantly higher,
whereas women’s income drop significantly after separation.
This is confirmed by the subjective perception of economic status: for women,
there is a significant drop in the ability to make ends meet due to separation, and
they report a worsened income situation compared with the previous year;
conversely men’s changes are not significant. Another significant effect is found on
savings: the DID effect of women is -0.145, while the figure for men is not
significantly different from zero. The effect of separation on transitions in the labour
Table 5 Effects of separation on several outcomes
Men Women
Effect SE N Effect SE N
Total monthly net household income (Euro) 234 171.5*** 142 -190 110.7*** 172
Income situation compared with previous year -0.155 0.132 142 -0.413 0.126*** 172
Ability to make ends meet -0.113 0.146 142 -0.430 0.131*** 172
Ability to afford payments related to life-style -0.155 0.132 142 -0.036 0.117 170
Ability to keep home adequately warm -0.063 0.048 142 -0.018 0.045 170
Inability to pay scheduled rent -0.021 0.024 141 -0.023 0.023 171
Inability to pay scheduled mortgage payments 0.014 0.017 142 -0.012 0.016 171
Inability to pay scheduled utility bills -0.007 0.036 142 -0.029 0.035 171
Inability to pay loan repayments 0.007 0.029 142 0.000 0.027 171
Some money left for savings 0.029 0.065 140 -0.145 0.060** 172
Exit from the labour market (workers only) 0.008 0.031 126 -0.039 0.046 102
Entry into the labour market
(inactive persons only)
0.063 0.204 16 0.114 0.067* 70
Weekly working hours (workers only) 0.588 1.260 114 1.926 1.196 94
Significance levels: ***, 0.01; **, 0.05; *, 0.1
Estimates with propensity score matching (1 neighbour, 1,000 replications)
60 F. Ongaro et al.
123
market is also interesting, since we found that women out of the labour market are
more likely to enter the labour force after separation. This result can be interpreted
as a signal that women undergo a significant well-being reduction after union
dissolution, a deterioration they try to cope with by finding a new job.
5.3 Influence of Living Arrangements after Union Dissolution
In the next step, we study in more detail the economic effects of union dissolution.
Table 2 shows that men, especially if they have children, are more likely to return to
their parental home after union dissolution, a fact that may partly explain the low
economic impact of separation on them. The presence of children greatly influences
home assignment within the couple: mothers are highly likely to remain in the same
home after conjugal separation, and fathers are highly likely to leave. This may be
an advantage for women in terms of housing quality but a disadvantage in terms of
income, as they need to share income with other non-productive family members.
Conversely, men are likely to be forced to leave the conjugal home and find new
accommodation, and the increased expense for the new dwelling may offset
economic advantages in terms of income (unless they return to their parental home).
So we examined the economic effect of separation depending on the living
arrangements after the union dissolution. We know that the choice of living
arrangement may be endogenous with the effect of union dissolution on economic
well-being. For instance, it may be argued that choice of living arrangements after
separation is, at least partially, driven by the economic situation. However, we may
reasonably assume, on the basis of the relatively high social acceptance of co-
residence with parents, even when over 30, that choice of living arrangements in
Italy is actually driven by the possibility of moving to the parental home: if men can
go back to their parents, they will probably do so, regardless of their economic
situation, thus avoiding a difficult search for a new dwelling. If they cannot, then
they have little choice, as alternatives to moving into a single-person household
after union dissolution are rare in Italy. Women with children are forced to remain
in the conjugal home they are assigned, if they want to keep it. So they are very
unlikely to move to their parental home, regardless of their economic situation. On
the basis of these arguments, we are confident that living arrangements after union
dissolution are not closely linked to the economic well-being of spouses, at least in
the period immediately after separation.
We replicated the above analysis on the subgroup of individuals with children,
and estimated the impact of union dissolution combined with subsequent living
arrangements. We considered a specific subgroup of parents. For men ‘‘treatment’’
consists of undergoing a separation and subsequently living alone, for women we
define ‘‘treatment’’ as undergoing separation and becoming a single parent the
following year. In this way, we identify what we expect to be the most common
living arrangements adopted by fathers and mothers after separation. Non-custodial
fathers are also usually obliged to leave the conjugal home, which is assigned to
custodial mothers, and to pay alimony for their children, so this probably is also the
subgroup of men who experience the most difficult economic situation. Similarly,
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custodial mothers are also likely to experience the worst-case scenario among
separated women as they must share their income with their children, and the
alimony they receive rarely offsets the increased expenses. If the above arguments
are true, estimations of the effects of marital dissolution on these particular
subgroups should reflect this. We expect to find a negative and significant effect
even for men, with women showing an even higher impact of separation than that
reported in Table 5.
The estimates shown in Table 6 basically meet our expectations: despite their
increased income, separated men’s perception is that their well-being has dropped
after their union dissolution. They report a significantly more deteriorated income
situation than the control group. The effect on ability to pay utility bills is -0.060,
i.e. their ability to pay utility bills decreases. The life-style conditions index is also
significantly lower. The situation of separated women further deteriorates when we
consider lone mothers only. The (negative) effect on income is largely confirmed by
the subjective perception. We find a significant effect on the ability to make ends
meet (-0.530), to afford payments related to life-style (-0.337), to keep the house
adequately warm (-0.085) and to save money during the year (-0.161). In addition,
we still find an effect on labour market entry rate—separated women being more
likely to enter the job market than the control group. Therefore, excluding men
returning to their parents’ home after separation, we find a significant impact of
union dissolution on men’s well-being, or at least on their subjective perception of
the quality of their life-style. As a confirmation of this, the same analysis was
conducted for fathers and mothers returning to the parental home. But the very small
number of cases (37 for men, 15 for women) does not allow us to draw any
inference from it.
Table 6 Effects of separation on several outcomes for two specific subgroups of separated persons.
Estimates with propensity score matching (1 neighbour, 500 replications)
Non-custodial fathers
living alone
Lone mothers
Effect SE N Effect SE N
Total monthly net household income (Euro) 598 415.1*** 45 -164 166.9* 102
Income situation compared to last year -0.441 0.170** 45 -0.530 0.127*** 102
Ability to make ends meet -0.089 0.263 45 -0.451 0.172** 102
Ability to afford payments related to life-style -0.467 0.235* 45 -0.337 0.156** 101
Ability to keep home adequately warm -0.057 0.056 45 -0.085 0.046* 102
Inability to pay scheduled rent 0.044 0.045 45 0.039 0.030 102
Inability to pay scheduled mortgage payments -0.022 0.018 45 -0.010 0.022 102
Inability to pay scheduled utility bills -0.060 0.030** 45 -0.046 0.033 102
Inability to pay loan repayment -0.044 0.058 45 -0.020 0.033 102
Some money left for savings -0.106 0.082 44 -0.161 0.054*** 102
Exit from the job market (workers only) 0.004 0.025 38 0.012 0.039 57
Entry in the job market (inactive persons only) – – – 0.100 0.053* 45
Significance levels: ***, 0.01; **, 0.05; *, 0.1
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6 Conclusions
The aim of this work was to provide an initial comprehensive, robust assessment of
the economic impact of union dissolution in Italy, considering that until now—
partly because of its low frequency—few empirical data were available to study the
phenomenon.
Our analyses, carried out on data representative at a national level and using
methods that take into account possible disturbing factors, indicate that union
dissolution in Italy produces differentiated economic effects for men and women, at
least in the short term.
Even after controlling for several conditions preceding separation, we found
that women are in a weaker position than men. Monetary and subjective measures
of economic well-being both indicate a worsening of women’s status in the year
after separation with respect to the last year of union. This happens even though
union dissolution forced some of them to increase their personal income by taking
a job after the event. Single mothers, in particular, suffer the heaviest drop in
living standards. Separation has mixed effects among men, suggesting that here
the event may produce different economic consequences according to the
subsequent living conditions. In general, men do not undergo negative economic
consequences after separation but when our analysis is concentrated on non-
custodial fathers living alone, we find that they also experience a drop in their
standard of living, even though their household income increases. The scarcity of
cases does not allow deeper analyses on this point (models for all subgroups of
separated men and women, classified according to the different living arrange-
ments after separation, could not be run). Our results empirically support the
hypothesis that the better economic position of Italian men depends on two
factors: personal income, and the opportunity, provided by the strong family
network, of returning—at least in the first period after separation—to the parental
home.
Two other important and more general results of this study must be stressed.
First, household income, even when equivalized and net of taxes, must be used
with caution as a proxy of changes in economic well-being for separated people.
The present empirical analysis demonstrates that individuals may suffer statistically
significant economic penalties in their living standards, even with a significant
increase in equivalized household income.
Second, separation may have opposite economic consequences in different
subgroups of separated people, and this does not depend only on the conditions
preceding separation, but also on those subsequent to the event. Considering that, at
least for those who are parents, post-separation living arrangements are gender-
differentiated, this work indicates that a correct interpretation of the gender
differences in the economic impact of union dissolution should take into account the
living arrangements after separation of both men and women. The same result also
suggests caution in interpreting the effects of union dissolution across different
countries. Indeed, results may be influenced by country differences in the distribution
of living arrangements after separation.
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